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Bantekas: The Human Rights and Developmental Dimension of Investment Laws:

THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENTAL DIMENSION OF
INVESTMENT LAWS: FROM INVESTMENT LAWS WITH
HUMAN RIGHTS TO DEVELOPMENT-ORIENTED INVESTMENT
LAWS
Ilias Bantekas*
Abstract
Domestic investment laws are classified in this Article as strong,
moderate, and weak in terms of their relevance for the protection of
human rights and the promotion of developmental goals. This Article
suggests that if human rights and development are to find a stable place
in the global investment architecture, a radical departure from the current
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) regime is required. It is
suggested that BITs be replaced with domestic investment laws that
contain precise developmental objectives for the host (developing) States.
Each prospective investor, in consultation with the host state, will
undertake a Development Impact Assessment (DIA), which will be
directed towards identifying and contributing to the host's development.
This system will eliminate the need for the negotiation of investment
guarantees in BITs because where the investors satisfy their stated
development-related duties and other obligations in the domestic
investment law, they will not be subject to further limitations.
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INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, several BITs have included provisions on human
rights and environmental protection.' Even so, BITs are generally geared
towards protecting the interests of investors from industrialized States.
Meanwhile, the developing host states are so eager to attract foreign
direct investment (FDI) that they are willing to lower their human rights
and environmental standards.2 This process is aptly described as a race to
the bottom. The persistent problem with investment-related human rights
is not so much the indifferent or abusive behavior of foreign investors or
their home States. It can generally be attributed to two factors: (1) host
states' poor domestication and monitoring of their human rights
obligations, which to some degree is predicated on the provision of
investment guarantees that are detrimental to poor host states; and (2) the
absence of a clear developmental plan and objectives in the pursuit of
foreign direct investment.
One of the fundamental claims of this Article is that BITs do nothing
to promote existing human rights or internationally established
environmental standards as they were not designed for that purpose. In
many cases, they are flatly opposed to these two objectives. However,
given the artificial fragmentation between foreign investment law and
1. Examples include the Agreement between Canada and (...) for the Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, art. XV, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/internationalinvestment-agreements/treaty-files/2820/download; MODEL TEXT FOR THE INDIAN BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATY art. 16.1, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/intemational-investmentagreements/treaty-files/3560/download; Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement
between the Federative Republic of Brazil and (...) art. XVI, https://investmentpolicy.
unctad.org/intemational-investment-agreements/treaty-files/4786/download.
2. See Kenneth J Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 HARv.
INT'L L. J. 469, 499 (2000), who argues that BITs "seriously restrict the ability of host states to
regulates foreign investment." The U.S. Model BIT, prohibits performance obligations beyond

what is established by international law, such as employability quotas of nationals of the host
state. See also Tarcisio Gazzini, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Sustainable Development, 15
J. WORLD INV.& TRADE 936 (2014), who argues that the aim of sustainable growth is not directly
measurable against the investor guarantees offered in BITs.
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human rights law (both treaty-based and customary), States are forced to
pursue these objectives through BITs, which, no doubt, seems absurd.
The other existing avenues to promote and implement human rights and
environmental standards are through domestic investment laws and
possible agreements between host states and investors. However, the
latter option is usually moot, particularly where there exists a BIT
favoring the investor in question. It seems unrealistic that an investor
would agree to commit itself to standards that are higher than a BIT or
the host state's domestic law, particularly where there was a risk that the
host would not accept the investment without such commitment on the
part of the investor.3 As a result, it falls to domestic investment laws to
fill this void. Yet, with minor exceptions, this Article suggests that current
investment laws in developing States are unable to meet human rights and
environmental expectations because they have already been curtailed by
a plethora of BITs and private investor-host state agreements. In any
event, such discussions should not even be taking place because host
states are under concrete obligations to implement duties arising from
human rights treaties to which they are parties. By seeking to enforce
human rights through BITs, which limit rather than augment their
potency, BITs effectively replace the major human rights treaties and
customary international law-an absurd and contradictory result.
This Article argues that rather than making a vague reference to
human rights, a development-based reform of the global investment
architecture is warranted. It is suggested that domestic investment laws
should transform themselves into mechanisms that promote and
implement concrete developmental objectives in the host state. To
support this argument, this Article attempts a classification of investment
laws based on the level of human rights protection offered therein. This
classification is meant to show that even at the highest level, the synergy
between human rights and investment is thin and is unconnected to the
broader picture of development, which is the primary purpose of
investment for developing countries. For the reader to understand the
rationale for a transition from BITs and investment laws with human
rights provisions to development-oriented investment laws, this Article
sketches three levels of human rights protection in investment laws,
namely: (a) strong investment laws, which refer directly to the country's
human rights legislation and international human rights treaties and
custom; (b) moderate investment laws, which include a reference to
constitutional values, or which require that investments must meet a
3. Even the most robust domestic investment framework that is intended to promote
human development is inclined to collapse if diffused by BITs that leave no room for meaningful
compromises. See Jeswald W Salacuse and Nicholas P Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An

Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their GrandBargain, 46 HARv. INT'L L. J. 67,
76 (2005).
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certain developmental value; and (c) weak investment laws, namely those
that refer to the host's domestic laws or the country's international
obligations, but which fail in practice to suggest that investors are bound
by the human rights provisions therein.
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows: Section 2
investigates the place of domestic human rights laws and their relevance
for foreign investors. Section 3 discusses the role of domestic human
rights laws in investment treaties and the principle of not relaxing
domestic legal standards. Section 4 then goes on to examine the three
variants identified by this author in the implementation of human rights
in domestic foreign investment laws. These are identified as strong,
moderate, and weak. It is based on this classification that Section 5
identifies the concept of development as the only viable and tangible
target that should be central to the investment laws of host states. The
analysis goes on to show how this may be achieved by a synergy between
constitutional and statutory law, as well as based on a pre-investment
Development Impact Assessment (DIA), which involves the active
involvement of both investors and host states.
I. DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS AND THEIR RELEVANCE FOR
FOREIGN INVESTORS

Much has been written about the interplay between obligations
originating from human rights treaties versus those arising from the
international law of foreign investment. 4 Obligations in human rights
treaties are addressed to States, and if one were to adapt these to the
context of foreign investment, the addressee would remain the same.
Strictly speaking, foreign investors do not possess human rights
obligations under human rights treaties. 5 At the same time, BITs and
other International Investment Agreements (IIAs) demand that foreign
investors obey the laws of the host state, to the degree that such laws are
not in conflict with the terms of the BIT and customary foreign
investment law. 6 The State remains the sole addressee of the obligations
contained in human rights treaties, and investors are bound to observe
such obligations only to the extent that they have been incorporated in the
4. See Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?, 60

INT'L COMP. L. Q. 573 (2011); Edward Guntrip, Self-Determination and Foreign Direct
Investment: Reimagining Sovereignty in International Investment Law, 65 INT'L COMP. L. Q. 829
(2016); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award,
1 121 (12 May, 2005), where the tribunal stated that "there is no question of affecting fundamental
human rights when considering the [application of the investment guarantees] contemplated by

the parties."
5. See ILIAS BANTEKAS AND LUTZ OETTE, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND
PRACTICE 339-98 (2d ed. 2016), on the obligations of non-state actors in the field of human rights.
6. See OFFICE OF THE US TRADE REP., 2004 US MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY,
art. XII (2004).
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laws of the host state. Otherwise, they exist only in the realm of interState relations. Crucially, if the host state has simply signed or ratified,
but has not subsequently adopted implementing legislation, the investor's
obligation to obey domestic law does not encompass the treaty in
question. 7 Of course, a State may just as well adopt human rights
legislation that goes far beyond the scope of existing human rights treaties
without ratifying any such treaty. In this exceptional eventuality, the
investor would be bound to observe (on the basis of pertinent BITs and/or
Multilateral Investment Treaties) this extensive body of domestic human
rights laws.
There is certainly much complexity as to what is encompassed within
a host state's domestic laws for the narrow purposes of delineating the
respective obligations of a foreign investor. In theory, what constitutes
valid law should be ascertained by reference to the host state's
constitutional requirements. 8 In practice, however, States may be forced
9
to circumvent their constitutional arrangements for a variety of reasons.
Something becomes law (i.e., it is binding) when it is approved based on
a special majority by a parliament-type of institution and is then
published (for transparency purposes) in an official gazette or other
publicly available outlet. States nowadays routinely contract through
instruments that bypass this formula. This includes private contracts that
include confidentiality clauses, executive agreements that are meant to be
expeditious (and which in theory do not concern substantive issues),
memoranda of understanding (MOU), and high-level decisions of
informal institutions, such as the Paris and London Clubs.

7. Where states do not incorporate an investment treaty to which they are parties into
domestic law, as is the case with Canada's relationship to NAFTA, the courts generally argue that
they have no jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of the treaty. See Hupacasath First
Nation v. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada and the Attorney-General of Canada, 2015

F.C.A. 4.
8. Petrobart Ltd. v. Kyrgyz Republic (Arb. Insi. of the Stockholm Chamber of Com. 2005)
62 7
.pdf. The tribunal highlighted
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita
art. 9(4) of the Kyrgyz Constitution, which included 'universally recognized principles of
international law' as part of the state's international obligations. The applicant investor relied on
the Kyrgyz investment law (in the absence of a BIT) and requested the tribunal to interpret art.
9(4) as encompassing a broader range of activities constituting 'foreign investment,' contrary to
the narrow list contained in the investment law. The tribunal declined to entertain the request.
9. See, e.g., BCB Holdings Ltd and Belize Bank Ltd v. Attorney-General of Belize, [2013]
2

CCJ 5 (AJ), http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/ 013/11/2013-CCJ-5AJ.pdf. The Caribbean Court of Justice held that a tax concession contracted in violation of the
Belize Constitution was invalid because such actions violate fundamental principles of
constitutional legal order and to "disregard these values is to attack the foundations upon which
the rule of law and democracy are constructed." BCB and the Bank of Belize bypassed the CCJ
by seeking to enforce the award in New York and ultimately succeeded in BCB Holdings Ltd. v.

Gov't of Belize, 650 F. App'x 17 (D.C. Cir. 2016), cert. denied 137 S. Ct. 619 (2017).
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A real-life illustration is instructive. According to Article 36(2) of the
Greek Constitution, international agreements must be ratified by an
implementing law that is adopted by the plenary of Parliament.
International agreements require a qualified ma ority of three-fifths of the
deputies per Article 28(2) of the Constitution.1 Following the post-2008
financial crisis, Greece sought to secure liquidity from inter-State
creditors and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) through a variety
of agreements. The terms of one of these, the Loan Agreement of 8 May
2010 (as amended by a subsequent agreement of 12 December 2012), was
discussed neither publicly nor in Parliament, including the severe
austerity measures contained therein. In fact, in a document entitled
Statement on the Support to Greece by Euro Area Members States of 11
April 2010,11 it was announced that the Euro Area member states,
together with the European Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF, were
prepared to provide a loan to Greece and that the terms of the loan had
"already been agreed."' 2
In addition to bypassing constitutional requirements to introduce an
agreement as domestic law, States in transition, emergency, or other
vulnerable circumstances, may conversely decide to be bound by an
agreement against another party (a State, IFI, an inter-governmental
organization or other), while precluding the agreement from taking effect
at the domestic level. During the Greek financial crisis, Article 1(4) of
Law 3845/2010 granted the Finance Minister authority to negotiate and
sign the texts of all pertinent loan and financing agreements (including
treaties, contracts, and MOUs). Although it was required under the
Constitution that all such agreements must be subject to parliamentary
ratification, this never happened. Five days after its adoption, Article 1(9)
of Law 3847/2010 modified article 1(4) of Law 3845 by stipulating that
the term "ratification" [by the Parliament] is replaced by "discussion and
information." 1 3 Moreover, all pertinent agreements (irrespective of their
legal nature) were declared as producing a legal effect upon their
signature by the Finance Minister-although such legal effect extends
only among the sovereign signatories; thus, it is not necessarily law.
Hence, Articles 28 and 36 of the Constitution were effectively bypassed
by a mere legislative amendment. What is more, Law 3845/2010 included
two of the three MOUs as mere annexes, relegating them to the status of
10. See Council of State [Plenary Assembly] 668/2012, p. 29 (Greece) the majority of the
Greek Council of State (ITE) members agreed with such an interpretation of art 28(2) of the
Constitution.
11. EUROGROUP,

STATES (Apr.

11, 2010),

STATEMENT OF THE SUPPORT TO GREECE BY EURO AREA MEMBERS

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/

113686.pdf.
12. Id.
13. TRUTH COMMITTEE ON
http://cadtm.org/IMG/pdf/Report.pdf.

PUBLIC

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol31/iss3/3
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"programme plans," 14 despite that the obligations contained in these
MOUs effectively circumvented domestic laws and Greece's obligations
5
under human rights treaties.'

Hence, what constitutes law for BIT obligations incumbent on foreign
investors may be as restrictive or expansive as a host state desires. A host
state may further restrict the application of existing human rights and
environmental laws to foreign investors by private agreement (including
stabilization clauses), a subsequent law, or even by consistent conduct.

II.

DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS IN INVESTMENT TREATIES AND THE
PRINCIPLE OF NOT RELAXING DOMESTIC LEGAL STANDARDS

Naturally, investment treaties find a special place within domestic
legal orders as a source of obligation for host states and foreign investors.
Observance of domestic law is an essential ingredient for the preservation
of legal certainty and the rule of law. However, powerful home States
have demanded (through BITs and other agreements) that domestic host
state laws, including human rights and environmental legislation, not be
such as to effectively expropriate assets or strip foreign investors of
legitimate investment guarantees.1 6 Although this seems common sense,
situations may well arise where a host state's generous BIT or contractual
obligations towards a foreign investor are in violation of its treaty-based
human rights obligations. Investment treaties deal with such issues by
prioritizing anti-expropriatory measures and breaches of investor
17
guarantees over and above other considerations. Exceptionally, such
14. Id. at 48-49.
15. See generally Ilias Bantekas and Renaud Vivien, On the Odiousness of Greek Debt, 22
EUROPEAN L. J. 539 (2016) (where the bypassing of constitutionally mandated processes is
described in more detail).

16. JOHANNE COx,
ed., 2019).

EXPROPRIATION IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION

(Loukas

Mistelis

17. Naturally, human rights treaty bodies and international human rights courts and
tribunals take the exact opposite view. E.g., Federation of Employed Pensioners of Greece (IKAETAM) v. Greece, (ECSR) No. 76/2012 Decision on the Merits, Eur. Comm'n. Of Soc. Rts. ¶
66-81 (Dec. 7, 2012), https://hudoc.esc.coe.int/eng/#{%22sort%22:[%22ESCPublicationDate
22
cc-76-2012-dmerits-en%22]; Pensioners'
%20Descending%22],%22ESCDctdentifier%22:[%
(ECSR) No. 75/2012 Complaint Eur.
Greece,
Union of the Agricultural Bank of Greece (ATE) v.
http://rm.coe.int/no-76-2012-federation-of-employed2012),
16,
(Jan.
¶48
Comm'n. Of Soc. Rts.
pensioners-of-greece-ika-etam-v-gree/16807423fa; Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria App. no.

49429/99 Eur. Ct. H.R.

¶

90 (2005); see also Eur. Comm. Of Soc. and Econ. Rts. (CESCR).

General comment No. 24 (2017) on State obligations under the International Covenant on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the context of business activities,
E/C.12/GC/24 (Aug. 10, 2017), which states that:

¶ 13, U.N. Doc.

States parties should identify any potential conflict between their obligations
under the Covenant and under trade or investment treaties, and refrain from
entering into such treaties where such conflicts are found to exist, as required
under the principle of the binding character of treaties. The conclusion of such

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

7

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 3

346

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LA W

[Vol.

31i

preferential treatment may be sidelined (or carved out) through general
exception clauses in investment treaties. Article 10 of the Canadian
Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPA)
stipulates that:
1. [Unless discriminatory and arbitrary], nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from
adopting or enforcing measures necessary:
(a) to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(b) to ensure compliance with laws and regulations that are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement;
Article 11 of the FIPA goes on to say that host states must not lower
domestic standards when attracting foreign direct investment. This
principle is accompanied by a consultation mechanism.
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage
investment by relaxing domestic health, safety, or
environmental measures. Accordingly, a Party should not
waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or
otherwise derogate from, such measures as an
encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion
or retention in its territory of an investment of an investor. If
a Party considers that the other Party has offered such an
encouragement, it may request consultations with the other
Party and the two Parties shall consult with a view to
avoiding any such encouragement.
The last sentence of Article 11 is a wonderful display of international
solidarity that places the international protection of human rights and the
environment above the host state's endeavor to attract foreign
investment. 18 However, this author is not aware of a single instance where
treaties should therefore be preceded by human rights impact assessments that
take into account both the positive and negative human rights impacts of trade
and investment treaties, including the contribution of such treaties to the
realization of the right to development... . The interpretation of trade and
investment treaties currently in force should take into account the human rights

obligations of the State, consistent with art 103 of the Charter of the United
Nations and with the specific nature of human rights obligations. States parties
cannot derogate from the obligations under the Covenant in trade and investment
treaties that they may conclude.
18. See Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and
for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Draft version 130515, art. 11 (hereinafter Norwegian Model BIT)

https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/e47326b61f424d4c9c3d470896492623/draft-modelagreement-english.pdf; see also Draft Agreement between the Government of the French

Republic and the Government of the Republic of (...) on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol31/iss3/3
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such consultations have taken place.1 9 Canadian federal law generally
provides for a consultation with indigenous persons in respect to federal
20
actions that may have an adverse or other similar impacts on them.
Despite the laudable objectives behind it, concerned investors have much
incentive to preclude the activation of this mechanism. Moreover, Article
11 and the consultations envisaged do not make us wiser as to the
alternatives for developing states when intense competition for FDI gives
them no choice but to relax their domestic standards.
Even discriminatory tax cuts in favor of foreign investors may
ultimately constitute a relaxation of domestic standards. By renouncing
resources otherwise stemming from predictable taxes, the host state limits
2
its capacity to invest in the national market. ' Additionally, these tax cuts
create an imbalance between nationals and investors. Moreover, tax cuts
increase investors' profits while at the same time reduce the promotion
of the development of the host state, especially where the investor does
not use the tax reduction to increase its productivity or otherwise create
new jobs. 22
Although the subject matter of corporate social responsibility and the
discussion on the human rights obligations of non-state actors is beyond
the scope of this Article, it is worth mentioning that some recent human
rights-friendly BITs approach the matter of lowering domestic standards
from a more pragmatic perspective. While Article 11 of the Norwegian
Model BIT uses the same language as Article 11 of the Canadian FIPA,
Article 32 stipulates that: "the parties agree to encourage investors to
conduct their investment activities in compliance with the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and to participate in the United
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment1(5),
art.
of Investments,
agreements/treaty-files/5874/download (stating "nothing in this agreement shall be construed to
prevent any contracting party from taking any measure to regulate investment of foreign
companies and the conditions of activities of these companies in the framework of policies
designed to preserve and promote cultural and linguistic diversity).
19. Hupacasath First Nation v. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada and the AttorneyGeneral of Canada, 2015 F.C.A. (upholding the Court of Appeals 2013 judgment of the Federal
Court, whereby the Canada/China BIT, which is similar to the FIPA, had not been proven to
produce any appreciable and non-speculative effects on the rights and interests of the appellants.).
20. Federal Canadian case law clearly suggests that high level management decisions and
structural changes generally give rise to a duty to consult First Nations (indigenous peoples) where
such actions may have an adverse impact on their livelihood. See Huu-Ay-Aht First Nation v. The
Minister of Forests, 2005 B.C.S.C. 697; Dene Tha' First Nation v. Canada (Minister of
Environment), 2006 F.C. 1354; Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekami Tribal Council, 2010
S.C.C. 43 (with the applicable test set out in paragraph 45); Kwicksutaineuk Ah-Kwa-Mish First
Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 F.C. 517.
21. George K Foster, Investors, States and Stakeholders: Power Asymmetries In
InternationalInvestment andthe Stabilizing Potentialof Investment Treaties, 17 LEWIS & CLARK

L. R. 364 (2013).
22. Vandevelde, supra note 2, at 477.
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Nations Global Compact" [emphasis added]. Such provisions, however,
reinforce the argument that investors have no human rights or
environmental obligations from BITs, nor from the laws of the host state
unless the latter says otherwise.
Overall, BITs demonstrate little reverence for domestic laws and, in
any event, avoid any deference to developing States' domestic laws in the
sphere of human rights and environmental regulation.
III. THE THREE LEVELS OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN FOREIGN
INVESTMENT LAWS

In absolute terms,.developing States, or States eager to attract foreign
investment to boost their development, generally relax rather than
augment their laws in favor of human rights, development, and
environmental protection. This Article identifies three types of domestic
investment laws based on their regulatory authority by which to enforce
human rights and environmental norms (both of which are part of the
general framework of development), namely strong, moderate, and weak.
This classification does not seek to assess how these laws are
implemented in practice, but rather how significant the synergy is
between the host's legislative framework and the obligations of investors.
An investment law that explicitly derives its authority from the
constitution and the host's treaty obligations provides standing for class
action constitutional suits, whereas this is not the case where investment
laws are divorced from the constitution and the host's human rights

legislation. 23
However, the rationale underlying this classification is to show that
even the best synergy paradigm (i.e., the human rights potential of
domestic investment laws) is unable to fulfill the promise of human
rights, let alone the promise of development. The link between human
rights and investment in investment laws, even if the latter derive their
authority from the host's constitution or its international human rights
obligations, does not guarantee that the investment will have a
developmental impact or will otherwise enhance socio-economic rights.
In developing countries, the protection of human rights is generally weak
23. It should be noted from the outset that it is beyond the ambit of this Article to evaluate
the impact of public participation, lobbying, and external pressure parameters on domestic
investment laws. In developed economies, such parameters significantly influence policy and
judicial activism. Hence, the potency of domestic laws (investment or other) is assessed by
reference to the various actors and parameters that effectively influence and shape them. It is

assumed that the impact of civil society is limited in developing economies and this can be
assumed to also apply with respect to the strengthening of investment laws. See Scott L Greer and
Maria Martin de Almagro Iniesta, How Bureaucracies Listen to Courts: Bureaucratized
Calculations and European Law, 39 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 361 (2013); Julie M Simmons, The
Role of Citizens in the 'Soft Law' of Select Social Policy Areas in Canada and the European
Union, 56 CAN. PUB. ADMIN. 270 (2013).
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and is structurally inefficient. As a result, it is a fallacy to presume that
such inefficiency will be remedied through the implementation of
investment laws. If investment laws are to make a tangible impact on
rights-other than the obligation of host states to adhere to their human
rights obligations and investors to conform to domestic laws-this can
only occur if they are directed towards developmental objectives and not
towards human rights in the abstract. The classification of the three levels
of human rights protection in existing investment laws in this Article,
brief as it is, aims to show exactly this; namely, that the linkages between
human rights in general and investment does not enhance socio-economic
rights and does not contribute to the host's overall development. It is
because of the failure of this human rights model in investment laws, as
set out in the following classification that we then go on to lay out the
contours of the developmental paradigm upon which investment laws
should be predicated.
A. Strong Domestic Investment Laws
A 'strong' investment law may be defined as that which is expressly
linked with the host state's human rights and environmental obligations,
as these are found in its constitution, regular legislation, and its treatyand customary-based commitments. It is clear, therefore, that a strong law
must be subordinate to these sources and interpreted in conformity with
these. Hence, justiciability and legal standing in respect of the investment
law's human rights and environmental aspects follow those found in the
constitution and the international obligations of the host state. It is no
wonder that strong laws are exceptional, and even where they exist, there
is insufficient data as to how they are applied and enforced against all
foreign investments and investors. The prime example is Section 3 of the
South African Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015,24 which is among
the very few with explicit reference to human rights. It reads:
This Act must be interpreted and applied in a manner that is
consistent with:
a. its purposes as contemplated by section 4;
b. the Constitution, including:
i. the interpretation of the Bill
contemplated in section 39 of the Constitution;

of Rights

ii. customary international law contemplated in
section 232 of the Constitution; and

24. The Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

§ 3 (s. Afr.).
11

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 3

350

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol.

31

iii. international law contemplated in section 233 of
the Constitution; and
c. any relevant convention or international agreement to
which the Republic is or becomes a party.
The interpretative obligations contained in Section 3 ordinarily apply
because of constitutional law, but few courts make the necessary
connection. 25 It is important that human rights treaties and customary law
be made an integral part of the host state's investment legislation to
eliminate any doubt about the so-called fragmentation of international
human rights and environmental law from foreign investment law.
B. Moderate Domestic Investment Laws
Domestic investment laws of a moderate strength are those that,
although linked to the host's constitution, the obligations contained
therein and the relationship between the two instruments is tenuous and
hardly decisive. In many situations, the law's reference to the constitution
is hortatory. In reality, there is no justiciability for entertaining suits
before a constitutional or supreme court or the law is interpreted per
existing obligations under BITs. There is no single standard of a moderate
strength investment law. The various sub-categories may generally be
clustered based on the following characteristics found in the host state's
foreign investment legislation: (a) investment laws requiring (simply, but
not effectively) adherence to the host's constitution; and (b) those
requiring adherence to treaties adopted by the host, but again without
reference to a tangible methodology and discernible legal standing.
1. Investment Laws Requiring Adherence to Local Constitutions
The first sub-category consists of statutes requiring the investor to
obey the constitution of the host state. Examples are reflected in several
South American investment laws. This is true of Article 1 of the
Argentine Ley de Inversiones Extranjeras (1993); Article 3 of the
Nicaraguan Ley de Inversiones Extranjeras 2000; Article 2 of the
Peruvian Ley de Inversiones Extranjeras (1991). Beyond South America,
one may equally point to Articles 5 and 19 of the Belarus Investment Law
(2013). Given the superior nature of constitutional law above all other
domestic laws, one would have expected such a requirement to require
no explicit mention. Constitutional adherence in the host's investment or
related laws is meaningful only where constitutional or other courts
25. The Republic of South Africa Constitutional Court is a unique paradigm of promoting

human rights, having adopted seminal judgments, especially in the field of socio-economic rights.
E g., Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and Others 2001 (1)
SA 46 (CC) (s. Afr.); South African Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5)

SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.). These judgments led to concrete and sweeping policy changes.
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possess jurisdiction to assess the constitutionality of a BIT, the local
investment law, and the contract between the host state and the investor.
Such jurisdiction has been exercised in numerous cases by constitutional
tribunals, and both the treaty in question and its application became the
26 A similar procedure has been
subject matter of judicial review.
exercised by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) as concerns
incompatibilities between the EU treaties and Member States' BITs. EU
treaties possess a supra-constitutional value given that they supersede
Member States' constitutions. In several cases, the CJEU has held that
where a BIT conflicts with said treaties, it violates EU law, and the
incumbent State incurs liability. 27
This line of reasoning suggests that a review of the constitutionality
of BITs, investment laws, and investment agreements is inherent in the
constitutional tradition of States and is integral to sovereign regulatory
powers.
Thus, where constitutional assessment is available (whether under the
constitution, investment law, or supra-national treaty), it is not open to
host states to enter into treaties or adopt laws and agreements that are
incompatible with their constitutions. Investors will undoubtedly argue
that BITs generally supersede local constitutions as constitutions
generally confer supremacy to international agreements. This is true, and
States may not invoke a violation of their domestic law to evade treaty or
28
customary obligations under international law. The problem lies in
situations of conflict between BITs and those constitutional provisions
that expressly implement the host's international obligations stemming
from human rights treaties and customary law. There is a long line of
debate concerning the outcome of such conflict, 29 but at the very least,
26. See Bolivian Constitutional Court, 10/5/2006, "Wilson Beimar Magne Hinojosa,

Diputado Nacional c. Eduardo Rodriguez Veltzd, Presidente Constitucional de

la Republica de

Bolivia, and Others" (concerning the constitutionality of BITs and their implementing legislation
in Bolivia.) (Bol.); equally, in Council of Canadians et al. v. Attorney General of Canada, [2006]
O.J. No 4751 (Can.) (where the Court of Appeal for Ontario held that NAFTA did not violate the
Canadian Constitution because it had not been incorporated into Canadian law and that in any
even its application did not infringe the rule of law nor the Charter of Fundamental Rights); Corte

Constituucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 3, 2010, Dictamen No. 020-10-DTI-CC,
Suplemento del Registro Oficial (No. 249, p. 12) (Ecuador); Corte Constituucional [C.C.]
[Constitutional Court], agosto 17, 2010, Dictamen No. 026-10-DTI-CC, Registro Oficial (No.

258, p.1) (Ecuador).
27. See Case C-249/06, Comm'n. of the Eur. Cmty. v. Sweden, 2009 E.C.R. 1-01335; Case

C-205/06, Comm'n. of the Eur. Cmty. v. Austria, 2009 E.C.R. I-01301.

28. Int'l L. Comm'n., Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/56/10
(2001), which states that: "The characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is
governed by international law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the
same act as lawful by internal law."

29. See Marko Milanovic, Norm Conflict in InternationalLaw: Whither Human Rights?,
20 DUKE J COMP. & INT'L L. 69 (2009).
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2. Investment Laws Requiring Adherence to International Agreements
The second type of investment statute that may be considered as being
of moderate strength is that which (at least in theory) subjects all laws in
the territory of the host state to the country's international agreements,
which includes human rights treaties. These investment laws are
contrasted in this Article from their 'strong' counterparts because they
refer to international agreements in general and not specific to human
rights. Article 91 of the 2016 Myanmar Investment Law, which is of this
nature, provides that:
If there is any provision of this law contrary to any matter
provided for in the international treaties and agreements
adopted by the Union, the provisions contained in the
international treaties and agreement shall be abided by for
such contradictory provision.3 0
No doubt, this is consistent with customary international law and
constitutional tradition (i.e., that international law supersedes conflicting
domestic law). Still, the implications in the interplay between treatybased human rights obligations and obligations arising from BITs are
unresolved. Much of this complexity arises from the fact that some
statutes refer specifically to BITs, but not to other international treaties,
and even where a provision is general, it does not cater to the likelihood
of conflicting rules of international law.31 Moreover, such provisions
apply between the investment law and treaties/custom, but not in the
relationship between the law and private agreements with private
investors, which may just as well disregard the host state's human rights
obligations and developmental objectives. For States that are not serious
about their human rights obligations, or which have no concrete
developmental objectives, provisions requiring general adherence to their
international obligations can constitute a wonderful excuse in favor of the
30. Other examples include, Republic of Guinea-Bissau Investment Code, Law no. 3/2011,
6 July, 2011, art. 19; Gambia Investment and Export Promotion Agency Act, Act no. 3 of 2010,

26 May, 2010, art. 41(1) (which however only refers to BITs and not to other treaties.); Law no.
004/2002, Feb. 21, 2002, The Democratic Republic of Congo Investment Code, art. 41; Angola

Private Investment Law, Law no. 10/18, June 26, 2015, art. 20(4) (but only as concerns rights of
investors under international law); Kazakhstan Law on Investments, Law no. 373-11, Jan. 8, 2003,

art. 2(4).
31. Although this matter is addressed in a few BITs, the matter is not resolved. See, e.g.,
Norwegian Model BIT, supra note 18, art. 29, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/

e47326b61 f424d4c9c3d470896492623/draft-model-agreement-english.pdf (stating that "The
provisions of this Agreement shall be without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the Parties
under other international agreements.").
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fragmentation suggested by BITs and general foreign investment law.
Moreover, it is not at all certain that even where a conflict exists between
a treaty-based human rights norm and a conflicting provision in the
investment law that the courts and administrative machinery of the host
state will find the existence of a conflict.
3. Weak Investment Laws
Finally, this Article classifies investment laws requiring the investor
simply to adhere to domestic laws (generally) as weak. This conclusion
is drawn based on considerations already explained and applies only
where domestic law is the sole source of obligation in the host state's
investment law. Where a country's legal system is fragile, its laws may
lack even the most rudimentary human rights protections and be devoid
of developmental objectives. Moreover, there may be little or no
enforcement against otherwise illegal actions of investors (e.g., relating
to the environment, corruption, etc.). On the contrary, where a legal
system is strong, and the rule of law is omnipresent, reference to domestic
laws is certainly meaningful because the rule of law provides, among
others, effective access to justice mechanisms.
4. Development-Oriented Investment Laws
Strong investment laws (with a human rights component) are present
in a handful of nations, at best, and even there, it is not always clear how
the host state can transform the human rights and environmental
obligations therein into tangible developmental results. It is suggested
that this can only be achieved if developmental objectives are imbedded
in domestic investment laws rather than relying on vague human rights
obligations without clear roles for the synergy between the host state and
each foreign investor.
Some, but very few, States have introduced such a developmental
dimension in their investment laws. By way of illustration, the Ethiopian
Investment Law, in its preamble, qualifies an investment as something
that has a developmental value. But it is not clear how this is to be
assessed and whether it is a sine qua non condition. In an equal manner,
Article 35 of the Venezuelan Ley Constitutional de Inversion Extranjera
Productiva stipulates that:
All foreign investment will meet the following conditions:
1. Contribute to the production of national goods and
services in order to meet domestic demand, as well as the
increase of non-traditional exports.
2. Contributing to the national economic development
and research and innovation capacities of the country, in
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addition to promoting the incorporation of goods and
services of national origin.32
Although human development is part of the international human rights
architecture, as formulated under the right to development 33 and
quantified in instruments such as the UNDP's Human Development
Index (HDI) or the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), its
enforcement, or at least its concretization as hard law, has been fiercely
resisted by developed states. 34 For BITs and foreign investment, human
development should be the key goal, rather than human rights, since the
latter should, in any event, is (or should) be an integral part of all host
states' obligations and investors should abide by it. The right to
development (RTD), as articulated in the UN Declaration on RTD,
reveals three fundamental building blocks that help demonstrate that the
entitlement is hardly an arbitrary construction. It is the natural outcome
of the enforcement of the International Bill of Human Rights. These are:
"the constant well-being" of all people,3 1 the inextricable nexus between
well-being and civil, political and socio-economic rights, 36 and the
responsibility of states internally and externally to promote such wellbeing through the pursuit of all human rights. 37 A structured and
comprehensive definition that included all three elements was articulated,
not without dissent, in 2010 by the UN Special Rapporteur on the RTD,
which will serve as a working definition for this Article:
The right to development is the right of peoples and
individuals to the constant improvement of their well-being
and to a national and global enabling environment conducive
to just, equitable, participatory, and human-centered
development respectful of all human rights. 38
This type of development should be pursued as a requirement in BITs
and host states' domestic laws on the basis that this is the only truly
beneficial impact of foreign investment. Development is typically
associated with the overall wealth of states and is often linked to
32. See also the longer set of developmental criteria, set out in Cooperation and Facilitation
Investment Agreement between the Federative Republic of Brazil and (...), supra note
preamble and art. 15.

1,

33. See generally G.A. Res. 41/128, (Dec. 4, 1986).
34. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Working Group on its Eleventh Session, ¶¶ 7-12,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/23 (June 10, 2010).
35. G.A. Res. 41/128, art. 2(3) (Dec. 4, 1986).
36. Id. art. 1(1) and 2(2).
37. Id art. 4-8.
38. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the High-level Task Force on its Sixth Session, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/15/WG.2/TF/2/Add.2 (Right to Development Criteria and Sub-criteria), Annex

(Mar. 8, 2010).
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indicators such as economic growth, per capita income, and balance of
payments, among others. The particular indicators of this type of
development are intended to measure the overall wealth of States, not the
well-being of their citizens. By way of illustration, a country's gross
domestic product (GDP), which represents the market value of its
products and services, may be high, the standard of living of its people
can remain relatively low. This is because GDP is not a measure of
personal income, 39 nor does it take into account the disparity in the
distribution of wealth or the enjoyment of essential services and goods
such as healthcare, education, water, and food. The measurement of
human well-being is a relatively new phenomenon in economics and
human rights literature. In 1990 the UNDP published its first Human
Development Report to demonstrate how economic growth translates into
human development. From the outset, the report took the approach that:
People are the real wealth of a nation. The basic objective of
development is to create an enabling environment for people
to enjoy long, healthy, and creative lives. This may appear
to be a simple truth. But it is often forgotten in the immediate
concern with the accumulation of commodities and financial
wealth.40
Human development is thus defined as enlarging peoples' choices,
chief among these being the ability to lead a long and healthy life, be
educated, and to enjoy a decent standard of living. The report noted that
although income helps formulate human choices, it is merely a means and
not an end. It distinguished between two sides of human development:
"the formation of human capabilities, such as improved health or
knowledge ... and the use that people make of their capabilities, for work
or leisure." 4 1 It identified three key indicators that may be used to
measure human development, namely, longevity, knowledge, and decent
39. The contemporary view rejects money-centric definitions of poverty. Instead, it
emphasizes the link between development and freedom in which case poverty is 'understood as
the deprivation of basic capabilities rather than merely as lack of income on its own.' Human
Rights Council, Implementation of H.R.C. Res. 6/13, 1 12, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/SF/2008/2 (Aug.
6, 2008). Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. (CESCR) has defined poverty as
'a human condition characterized by the sustained or chronic deprivation of the resources,
capabilities, choices, security and power necessary for the enjoyment of an adequate standard of
living and other civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights.' Comm. on Econ., Soc., and

Cultural Rts., Statement Adopted by the CESCR,

¶ 8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/10 (May 4, 2001).

A non-money-centric definition is also offered by the EU's European Consensus on Development,
2006 O.J. (C46/1), ¶ 11. It notes, among other things, that poverty "includes all the areas in which
people of either gender are deprived and perceived as incapacitated in different societies and local
contexts."
40. UNDP, Human Dev. Rep. at 9 (1990).

41. Id. at 10.
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living standards. 4 2 These three indicators, known as the Human
Development Index (HDI), offer markedly different results from the
numbers reflecting the GDP of nations. Of course, democratic
governance, a solid income, the enjoyment of human rights, and similar
factors are also relevant to the processes of human development.
It should be observed, however, that the notion of a developmental
objective in BITs is not universally shared, and this may be at odds with
investment laws requiring such objective. This is true even in respect of
the more human rights-oriented BITs. Article 8(1)(ix) of the Model
Norwegian BIT expressly clarifies that there shall be no performance
requirement "to achieve a given level or value of research and
development in its territory."Understandably, powerful developed States
are suspicious of investment laws requiring that all investment possess a
development value. 43 However, there is no reason why BITs cannot
determine that this applies to some investments (e.g., not portfolio
investment) and that clear guidelines are set out in an annex or the body
of the BIT and that these guidelines are based on the right to development
and the UNDP's Human Development Index.44
5. Reform of Investment Architecture: Replacing BITs with
Development-Oriented Investment Laws
It is a key argument of this Article that if BITs are unable to bring
about developmental objectives, then they can and should be replaced by
investment laws that offer sound investment guarantees on the one hand
and set out their developmental agenda on the other. The benefits for
investors currently found in BITs may just as well be served by sufficient
exhibition of credible commitments in domestic laws. 4 5 There is no
conclusive qualitative or quantitative evidence in the existing literature
concerning a binary effect between BITs and increased FDI flows. 4 6 It is
42. Id. at 11.
43. An exception may be Switzerland, whose BITs mention economic development of host
states in the preamble. See Gazzini, supra note 2, at 941.
44. See Federico Ortino, Investment Treaties, Sustainable Development
and
Reasonableness Review: A Case Against Strict Proportionality Balancing, 30 LEIDEN J. OF INT'L

L. 76 (2017).
45. On 'credible commitments', see Jay Dixon and Paul A. Haslam, Does the Quality of
Investment Protection Affect FDIFlows to Developing Countries? Evidence from Latin America,
39 WORLD ECONOMY 1080, 1083 (2016).
46. See Eric Neumayer and Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign
Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 3 WORLD DEV. 31 (2005); Emma Aisbett, Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Correlation versus Causation, in THE EFFECT
OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE

TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS 395 (Karl P Sauvant and Lisa E Sachs eds., 2009);
Umakrishnan Kollamparambil, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Investor State Disputes (Econ.

Res. S. Afr., Working Paper 589/2016).
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also natural and undoubted that BITs were neither designed to be nor are
necessarily conducive to sustainable development. Kollamparambil cites
47
Robert Keohane's interpretation of diffused reciprocity and argues that
there is an existence of "issues with diffused reciprocity imbibed in BITs
leading to the unequal distribution of rights and obligations between
countries." 48
All the more reason for arguing in favor of replacing BITs with strong
and development-oriented investment laws is the bitter experience of
many developing countries with investment guarantees in BITs that
effectively curtailed, if not wholly inhibited, their. regulatory power as
49 India, for
regards the environment and sustainable development.
example, has argued that the necessary regulation of many aspects of
sustainable development, such as drinking water, health care standards,
and environmental law, was challenged by foreign investors as violations
of its existing BITs. 50
The claim outlined in this Article for reforming the existing BITsbased system of foreign investment with a development-oriented
framework is not new to international law. The contribution of
investments to the economic development of host states was one of the
51
criteria set out in the Salini case by an ICSID tribunal, even if it has
since fallen from grace. If human development is to become the key
performance criterion in the investment laws of developing host states, it
must be clearly explained therein what the role of investors is and how
such role is to be measured and quantified.52 For purposes of consistency,
the pursuit of human development should be predicated on the Right to
Development Declaration and the HDI, but this still leaves much space
53
for the precise requirements demanded of investors. As far as this author
47. Robert Keohane, Reciprocity in InternationalRelations, 40 INT'L ORG 1 (1986).
48. Kollamparambil, supra note 46, at 13.
49. Gazzini, supra note 2, at 923, 938; see also Rodrigo Polanco, Jolle De Sepibus and
Kateryna Holzer, TTIP and Climate Change: How Real Are Race to the Bottom Concerns?, 3
CARBON & CLiMATE L. R. 206, 207 (2017) (referring to negative effects on sustainable
development caused by compromises during discussion on the TTIP).

50. See Prabhash Ranjan and Pushkar Anad, The 2016 Model Indian BilateralInvestment
Treaty: A CriticalDeconstruction, 38 NORTHWESTERN J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 5 (2017).
51. Salini v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. Arb/00/04, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23,
2001).
52. The precise formulation of entrenched human rights norms has become much easier
with the introduction and extensive use of human rights indicators and benchmarks in respect of
all human rights. See David McGrogan, Human Rights Indicators and the Sovereignty of
Technique, 27 EUROPEAN J. OF INT'L L. 385 (2016). Of course, DIAs are generally un-explored in
both the literature and practice, but existing indicators constitute a sound blueprint, albeit each
DIA, as is the case with HRIAs need to be personalized.
53. The South American experience with BITs and investment arbitration, for good or bad,
has been particularly negative. Countries like Ecuador have not only denounced most of their
BITs and withdrew from ICSID, but moreover set up citizens' commissions to audit the BITs,
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is aware, there is no blueprint for a Developmental Impact Assessment
(DIA). However, human rights impact assessments are now
commonplace in international development assistance agreements, as
well as in the obligations of states operating through IFIs and intergovernmental organizations.
General Comments by treaty bodies emphasize the obligation of
States to carry out Human Rights Impact Assessments (HRIAs) in the
context of budgeting, business activities, trade and investment
agreements, and the privatization of public services, including potential
extraterritorial-human rights impacts. 54 Most inter-governmental
organizations oblige their organs and sub-entities to undertake HRIAs
through internalized guidelines. This is true, for example, in respect of
the EU whenever its organs adopt legislation or enter into international
agreements.5 5 The CJEU has emphasized the importance of such HRIAs
in the adoption of primary and secondary EU legislation. 56 In one case, a
complaint was made to the EU Ombudsman, arguing that in the context
of the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, the EU Commission refused
to prepare an HRIA, even though such agreements produce a significant
impact on populations emerging from non-market economies, as was the
case with Vietnam. 57 The Ombudsman found such a failure to constitute
an instance of mal-administration.5 8
The proliferation of HRIAs among states and inter-governmental
organizations has given rise to several common criteria and indicators. A
leading commentator and current UN Independent Expert on the impact
of foreign debt on human rights has described these as follows:
The purpose and steps for carrying out an HRIA based on
classic impact assessment approaches are also wellestablished. These include: a) preparation and screening of
possible human rights impacts in consultation with affected
finding these to have only benefited investors. This led to a new Model BIT initiative, which
among others insists on a more precise definition of "investment" and "profit," safeguards the
ability of host states to regulate in the public interest and gives increased weight to human rights
and environmental protection. See CECILIA OLIVET, CTR. FOR RES. ON GLOBALIZATION, WHY DID
ECUADOR TERMINATE ALL ITS BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES?

(2017).

54. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., Gen. Comment No. 24,

¶

17, 21-22, U.N.

Doc. E/C.12/GC/24, (Aug. 10, 2017); Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, Gen. Comment 19,
U.N. Doc. CRC/CG/19 (July 10, 2016).

¶ 47,

55. Operational Guidance on taking account offundamental rights in Commission impact
assessments (Eur. Comm., Working Paper SEC (2011) 567 Final, May 6, 2011).

56. Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert v. Land
Hessen, 2010 E.C.R. 1-11063.
57. See generally Council Decision 2019/1121 of 25 June 2019, EU-Vietnam Trade and
Investment Agreement, 2019 O.J. (L 186) 3.
58. EUR. OMBUDSMAN, DRAFT RECOMMENDATION OF THE EUR. OMBUDSMAN IN THE
INQUIRY INTO COMPLAINT

1409/2014/JN

AGAINST THE

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol31/iss3/3

EUR.

COMM'N (Mar. 26,

2015).
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groups; b) scoping; c) evidence gathering and data collection
using qualitative and quantitative methods; d) analyzing
impacts; e) development of recommendations aimed at
preventing adverse human rights impacts or to ensure that
they are mitigated; f) reporting and presentation of the
findings; and g) ongoing evaluation and monitoring of actual
9
impacts. 5
It is based on HRIAs that DIAs can be elaborated and developed as
annexes to host states' domestic laws. Although it is beyond the scope of
this article to explain in any detail the exact contents of a DIA, they
should, in general, set out a balanced quantitative and qualitative account
as to what may be expected of investors, but equally how the host state is
to capitalize from the investor's presence.
Developmental needs differ as does the capacity and expertise of each
investor. Still, one may cite the need for enhanced technology transfer,
training of the local workforce, emphasis on educational opportunities,
environmental and energy efficiency capacity building, emphasis on the
60
hiring of women, or disadvantaged populations and many others. A
crude example, and one not predicated on a structured and well-thoughtout investment law, was the Volkswagen Group's investment in Rwanda
in the form of a plant for compact cars. This investment was part of a
joint scheme between the company and the two governments (i.e.,
Rwanda as the host state and Germany as the home State) to implement
a system of modern infrastructure, especially involving the introduction
61
of e-mobility and car-sharing to the African market. Although it is too
early to tell how this project will fare, it is important to highlight the
introduction of modern technology in the country, infrastructure
development, and cost-effective transport permeating all levels of society
through a single investment. This investment will provide meaningful
employment opportunities for a good part of Rwanda's educated
generation, which will, in turn, stem the country's brain drain, in addition
to reinforcing the secondary economy.

59. Juan P Bohoslavsky, Guiding Principles to Assess the Human Rights Impact of
Economic Reforms? Yes, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 402, 414 (Ilias Bantekas and

Cephas Lumina eds., 2018).
60. See Rui Moura and Rosa Forte, The Effects of Foreign Direct Investment on the Host
Country Economic Growth: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 58 SINGAPORE ECON. REV. 1 (2013).
61. Christian Hetzner, VW Invests $20 Milllion in Rwanda's FirstCar Plant, AUTOMOTIVE
NEWS EUROPE (June 27, 2008), https://europe.autonews.com/article/
vw-invests-20-miI ion-in-rwanda-s-first-car-plant.
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CONCLUSION

While mapping the potency of domestic investment laws and
classifying them into strong, moderate, and weak, this Article attempts to
break the mold of the existing foreign investment regulatory framework.
It suggests that the pursuit of human rights in foreign investment law,
'while important, is, to a large degree, misleading. States already have an
obligation under treaty and customary law to enforce human rights on
their territory, and even extraterritorially under certain circumstances.
That they have to rely on BITs and investment tribunals to make this
happen marginally is absurd. States should be implementing their human
rights obligations irrespective of BITs, and no other treaty obligation
should curtail, directly or indirectly, human rights. In this light, BITs and
general foreign investment law should be construed in a manner that is
consistent with customary human rights obligations.
If, as the existing literature argues, BITs inhibit development (and
hence the whole range of human rights) in developing countries, then
such a developmental role can and should be played by domestic
regulation, perhaps through a new generation of development-oriented
investment laws that replace existing BITs. This argument is all the more
poignant in the wake of BIT denunciations in South America (and ICSID
withdrawal), as well as the rise of new Model BITs from Brazil, India,
and other BRICS. 62 At present, the investment laws of developing nations
are inadequately drafted, let alone equipped to drive through robust
developmental objectives. They are subordinate to BITs, have been
designed neither under a human rights-based approach (HRBA) nor in a
manner that promotes development or in a structured manner that curbs
one or more investment guarantees inhibiting development.
The broader framework that should be pursued is that of development,
in the manner set out by the UN Declaration on the Right to Development
and as quantified by UNDP's Human Development Index. Development
is an altogether different proposition from just observing existing human
rights obligations. It requires that a developmental plan be adopted, and
that inward foreign investment be made an integral part of that plan. Each
investor should know what is expected of its investment and what his or
her developmental obligations are. There may well need to be an
agreement with each investor to specify each party's roles and functions,
and this will encompass agreement on applicable investment guarantees;
based on such agreements, the investor will be able to make an informed
judgment as to whether the investment is worthwhile in the medium and
long term. It may also be the case that the investor or the host state will
have to undertake a DIA upon application from each investor to identify
the impact and ascertainable actions and goals. All of this information
62. See Ranjan and Anad, supra note 50.
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will be contained in the host's investment law, which by necessity, will
be a living instrument that is to be supplemented by the DIA and other
specialized agreements between the host and the investor.
Based on the aforementioned, BITs will ultimately have to be replaced
by development-oriented investment laws. This is a radical departure
63
from the existing foreign investment architecture. Yet, this paradigm
resolves many of the woes of several scattered fields of international law
and policy. For one thing, it resolves the fragmentation between
environmental and human rights law with foreign investment law.
Secondly, it serves to bridge international development law and finance
with foreign investment and, in the process, decrease reliance on foreign
aid or development assistance. Thirdly, it may effectively undo the
complex web of investment guarantees. Were the host state to agree on a
specific developmental role for each investment-and assuming the
investor abides with the host's human rights and environmental laws-it
is assumed that no further limitations bind the investor/investment. By
way of illustration, if it were agreed that the developmental objective of
a particular agricultural investment is to transfer know-how to local
farmers while simultaneously introducing cheap and efficient seeds to the
local market and increasing access of local products to international
markets, there is no need to impose any other investment restrictions on
said investor/investment. This suggests that it is in the interests of
investors to contribute to the preparation and implementation of DIAs
and their enforcement because this significantly reduces their
responsibility and obligations towards the host state. Investment laws are
the best and most efficient vehicles for such an endeavor."

63. But no less radical than the proposal for bilateral arbitration agreements (BATs),
propounded by one of the leading arbitration practitioners of his generation. See Gary Born, Chair,
International Arbitration Practice Group, WilmerHale, BITs, BATs, and Buts: Reflections on
International Arbitration (Apr. 16, 2014), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?reload

-9&v=ZdRjWcPQBs.
64. This author is currently engaged with other stakeholders in setting out the contours of a
prototype DIA, with the aim of presenting it to governments for possible future adoption.
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